Enhancing policy capacity on the issue of foreign credential recognition. Fernandes, L. Producing workers: The politics of gender, class, and culture in the Calcutta jute mills. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Fisher, S. Negotiating at the margins: The gendered discourses of power and resistance. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Ganguly, K. States of exception: Everyday life and postcolonial identity.
Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press. Girard, E. Assimilation and exclusion of foreign trained engineers in Canada: Inside a professional regulatory organization. Antipode, 39 1 , Goldberg, M. How current globalization discourses shape access: Professions and trades policy in Ontario. Graham, H.
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Surveying through stories. Roberts Eds. London: Routledge. Guo, S. Guo, Y. Racializing immigrant professionals in an employment preparation ESL program. Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry, 1 1 , Canadian Ethnic Studies, 45 1 , Handel, M. International Labour Organization.
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Toronto: York University. Jermier, J. Resistance and Power in Organizations. Li, P. Destination Canada: Immigration debates and issues. Don Mills: Oxford University Press. Mahmood, S. Cultural Anthropology, 16 2 , — Maitra, S. Mohanty, C. Cartographies of Struggle: Third World women and the politics of feminism. Russo Eds. Moss, P. Work and Occupations, 23 3 , Stories employers tell: Race, skill and hiring in America.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Nickson, D. The importance of attitude and appearance in the service encounter in retail and hospitality. Managing Service Quality, 15 2 , Paris: OECD. Schmitt admits that the principle of democracy is the only principle of legitimacy that is available as an ideological basis for a contemporary constitution PT 50—2; CPD 22— But it is difficult to see how this could be possible. The only candidate for sovereignty in a democratic polity is the popular sovereign, composed of politically equal citizens. A popular sovereign, it seems, cannot be a Schmittian sovereign, as it will only be able to decide under existing constitutional rules that determine how the people as a collective are to form a unified will.
Schmitt prepared the groundwork for a solution to this problem in Dictatorship , his historical study of the development of the institution of dictatorship McCormick , —56; Cristi —25; Kalyvas , 88—; Kelly Dictatorial power in its original, Roman form is a formally delegated and time-limited power to defend an already existing republican constitution through the use of extra-legal force D xlii—xliv, 1— In the course of modern constitutional history, however, the institution of dictatorship, Schmitt claims, fused with sovereignty, and this fusion related sovereignty to democracy.
The absolutist sovereign did possess the sovereign power to decide on the exception, and was thus capable of authorizing commissars to use dictatorial methods in his name.
But the notions of dictatorship and sovereignty were not yet fused. The commissarial dictators of the absolutist sovereign were mere agents of the sovereign and did not themselves possess the power to decide on the exception. But the relation between sovereignty and dictatorship changed in the French revolution. The revolutionary governments relied heavily on dictatorial action to create a new situation of normality that would allow a new constitution to come into force.
The revolutionary governments, like the absolutist sovereign, claimed the power to decide on the exception, but they did not claim to be sovereign. Rather, they claimed to exercise the authority to decide on the exception in the name of the French people, even while they were ruling the French people by the use of dictatorial methods D — Sovereignty and dictatorship had become fused in the novel institution of sovereign dictatorship: A sovereign dictator is a dictator who does not defend an already existing constitution but attempts to create a new one and who does so not by his own authority but in the name of the people D — It can exist only where it has become possible to take a sovereign decision on the exception in the name of the people.
Sovereignty, Schmitt concludes, is not just compatible with democracy but central to it, as it is exercised whenever and wherever a democratic constitution is founded CT —10, —6; CPD The fact that a democratic constitution cannot endow a particular person with permanent sovereign authority does not entail that the possibility of a genuine sovereign decision on the exception has disappeared.
The sovereign dictator has the power, in taking the decision on the exception, to set aside the positive legal and constitutional order in its entirety and to create a novel positive legal and constitutional order, together with a situation of social normality that fits it. It follows that the sovereign dictator cannot base his claim to be acting in the name of the people on any kind of formal authorization. If the old constitution no longer exists and the new one is not yet in force, there is no formal procedure for generating a public will.
And yet, the sovereign dictator claims to exercise the constituent power of the people. Individuals may have personal enemies, but personal enmity is not a political phenomenon. Politics involves groups that face off as mutual enemies CP 28—9. Two groups will find themselves in a situation of mutual enmity if and only if there is a possibility of war and mutual killing between them.
Schmitt believes that political enmity can have many different origins. The political differs from other spheres of value in that it is not based on a substantive distinction of its own. The ethical, for example, is based on a distinction between the morally good and the morally bad, the aesthetic on a distinction between the beautiful and the ugly, and the economical on a distinction between the profitable and the unprofitable.
The political distinction between friend and enemy is not reducible to these other distinctions or, for that matter, to any particular distinction — be it linguistic, ethnic, cultural, religious, etc. It is possible, for instance, to be enemies with members of a hostile group whom one judges to be morally good. And it is equally possible not to be engaged in a relationship of mutual enmity with a group whose individual members one judges to be bad. The same holds, Schmitt thinks, for all other substantive distinctions that may become markers of identity and difference.
Any distinction that can serve as a marker of collective identity and difference will acquire political quality if it has the power, in a concrete situation, to sort people into two opposing groups that are willing, if necessary, to fight against each other CP 37—8. Whether a particular distinction will come to play this role is not determined by its own intrinsic significance but by whether a group of people relies on it to define its own collective identity and comes to think of that identity, as based on that distinction, as something that might have to be defended against other groups by going to war.
Political identification is likely to latch on to another distinction that will inherit the lethal intensity of political conflict See ND.
Dissenting Citizenship: South Asian Muslim Youth in the United States after 9/11
But wherever a distinction has political quality, it will be the decisive distinction and the community constituted by it will be the decisive social unit. Schmitt claims that one cannot judge, from an external perspective, that a group is morally unjustified in defining its own identity in a certain way and to introduce political enmity, with the attendant possibility of killing, to preserve that identity. Only members of a group are in a position to decide, from the perspective of an existentially affected participant, whether the otherness of another group amounts to a threat to their own form of life and thus potentially requires to be fought CP 27; See also CT 76—7, A group that perceives its own existence to be threatened by some other group, Schmitt argues, finds itself in an analogous position.
The possibility of third-party mediation is therefore ruled out in a truly political conflict CP 45— A political community exists, then, wherever a group of people are willing to engage in political life by distinguishing themselves from outsiders through the drawing of a friend-enemy distinction CP 38, 43—4. A people, thus, will have an existence prior to all legal form as long as there is a sense of shared identity strong enough to motivate its members to fight and die for the preservation of the group. And as long as a people exists in this way it is capable, through its support, to sustain a sovereign dictatorship exercised in its name CT — A political community does not enjoy simple biological existence.
It might die though all of its individual members continue to live. The drawing of a friend-enemy distinction, therefore, is never a mere reaction to a threat to a form of existence that is already given but see Mouffe , 49— Rather, it actively constitutes the political identity or existence of the people and determines who belongs to the people. Schmitt realizes, of course, that it is possible for people who are not willing to identify in this way to be legally recognized as citizens, and to live law-abidingly, under the norms authorized by some positive constitution.
In a liberal state, Schmitt fears, the political nation will slowly whither and die as a result of spreading de-politicization, it will succumb to internal strife, or it will be overwhelmed by external enemies who are more politically united CP 69—79; L 31— To avert these dangers, Schmitt suggests, it is necessary to make sure that the boundaries of the political nation and the boundaries of citizenship coincide.
The point of this remark is that a state can only be legitimate if its legal boundaries embody a clear friend-enemy distinction. In order to achieve this aim, Schmitt clearly implies, a sovereign dictator, acting in the interstices between two periods of positive constitutional order, must homogenize the community by appeal to a clear friend-enemy distinction, as well as through the suppression, elimination, or expulsion of internal enemies who do not endorse that distinction CP 46—8. Schmitt observes that his concept of the political is not belligerent. It does not glorify war, but merely claims that a community that is interested in living politically needs to be willing to go to war if it perceives its political existence to be threatened CP 32—5.
On a descriptive level, Schmitt claims that liberalism has a tendency to deny the need for genuine political decision, to suggest that it is neither necessary nor desirable for individuals to form groups that are constituted by the drawing of friend-enemy distinctions. As a result, liberalism is unable to provide substantive markers of identity that can ground a true political decision. Liberal politics, consequently, boils down to the attempt to domesticate the polity, in the name of the protection of individual freedom, but it is unable to constitute political community in the first place CP 69—79; CPD 33— But in order for this observation to amount to a critique of liberalism, Schmitt needs to explain why a liberal subversion of the political would be undesirable.
And a state that has suffered a subversion of the political, induced by liberal ideology, Schmitt argues, will be unable to offer protection to its members, because it will fail to protect them from the indirect rule of pluralist interest-groups that have successfully colonized the state LL 17—36, L 65—77 and, more importantly, because it will lack the power to protect them from external enemies CP 51—3. If a people is no longer willing to decide between friend and enemy the most likely result will not be eternal peace but anarchy or subjection to another group that is still willing to assume the burdens of the political.
Beyond the Binary: Reconstructing Cultural Identity in a Multicultural Context
Schmitt seems to admit that a global hegemon might one day be able to enforce a global de-politicization, by depriving all other communities of the capacity to draw their own friend-enemy distinctions, or that liberalism might one day attain global cultural hegemony, such that people will no longer be interested in drawing friend-enemy distinctions CP 35, 57—8. Schmitt, then, cannot rest his case against liberal de-politicization on the claim that it is an unrealistic goal. He needs to argue that it is undesirable even if it could be achieved Strauss Schmitt replies to this challenge that a life that does not involve the friend-enemy distinction would be shallow, insignificant, and meaningless.
A completely de-politicized world would offer human beings no higher purpose than to increase their consumption and to enjoy the frolics of modern entertainment.
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It would reduce politics to a value-neutral technique for the provision of material amenities. As a result, there would no longer be any project or value that individuals are called upon to serve, whether they want to or not, and that can give their life a meaning that transcends the satisfaction of private desires CP 35, 57—8; RK 21—7; PR —62; WS 85— Schmitt argues in Political Theology that all key concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts, which suggests that a political theory that continues to use these concepts needs a theological foundation PT 36— In The Concept of the Political , Schmitt claims that all true political theorists base their views on a negative anthropology which holds that man is by nature evil and licentious, and thus needs to be kept in check by a strong state capable of drawing a friend-enemy distinction if there is to be social order CP 58— This latter thesis, Schmitt admits, can take a secular form, as in Hobbes or Machiavelli, as the purely descriptive claim that man is inherently dangerous to man.